

# Security Best Practices for Databricks on GCP

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## 1. Introduction

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Databricks has worked with thousands of customers to securely deploy the Databricks platform, with the appropriate security features that meet their architecture requirements. While many organizations deploy security differently, there are guidelines and features that are commonly used by organizations who need a high level of security.

This document details typical security features that are deployed by most high-security organizations, and reviews the largest risks and the risks that customers ask about most often. It will then provide a security configuration reference linked to our documentation and finally a collection of recommended resources.

This document is focused on the Databricks platform on GCP (sometimes called E2) and assumes at least the Premium tier. It also contains some Terraform examples.

## 2. Databricks architecture

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Databricks is a hybrid PaaS general-purpose data-agnostic compute platform.

The phrase hybrid PaaS applies because most customers deploy a data plane (virtual network and compute) in a cloud service provider account (such as GCP, Azure, or AWS) that is owned by the customer and so is single-tenant, while the multi-tenant control plane is run within Databricks account. Customers get the benefits of a PaaS platform with the option to keep your data processing clusters locally within your environment.

The phrase general-purpose data-agnostic means that unlike a pure SaaS service, Databricks doesn't know what data your teams process with the Databricks platform. Your teams provide the actual code, business logic, and the datasets. You won't find recommendations like "truncate user IDs" because we don't know what data you're analyzing.

If you're new to the Databricks platform, start with an overview of the architecture and review of common security questions before you hop into specific recommendations. You'll see those at our [Security and Trust Center](#) and the [security and trust overview whitepaper](#).

## 3. Typical security configurations

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Below, you will find the typical security configurations seen by Databricks. For simplicity, we've separated these into "most deployments" and "highly-secure deployments." Most deployments are as they sound – configurations that Databricks expects to be present in most production or enterprise deployments such as Single Sign-On (SSO) protected by multi-factor authentication (MFA). The configurations for highly-secure deployments are more representative of things seen in environments with very sensitive data, intellectual property, or in regulated industries such as Healthcare, Life Sciences, or Financial Services, such as usage of [data exfiltration protections](#).

Importantly, these are recommendations based on the configurations we see from our customers, and following them doesn't guarantee that you will be "secure." Please review in the context of your overall enterprise security to determine what is required to secure your deployment and your data.

### Most deployments

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The following typical configurations are part of most enterprise production Databricks deployments. If you are a small data science team of a few people, you may not feel the need to deploy all of these. If Databricks may become a key part of your business or if you are analyzing sensitive data, we recommend that you review these.

- Evaluate whether [multiple workspaces](#) are required for segmentation
- Check that your [GCS buckets are encrypted and that public access is blocked](#)
- Deploy Databricks into a [customer-managed VPC](#) for increased control over the network environment. Even if you do not need this now, this option increases the chances for future success with your initial workspace
- [Authenticate via single sign-on](#)
- Use [multi-factor authentication](#)
- [Separate accounts with admin privileges](#) from day-to-day user accounts
- Configure [Databricks audit log](#) delivery
- Configure maximum token lifetimes for future tokens using [token management](#)
- Configure [admin console settings](#) according to your organization's needs
- Apply bucket policies or other mitigations to [avoid storing production datasets in DBFS](#)
- [Backup your notebooks stored in the control plane](#) or store your notebooks in [git repos](#)
- [Store and use secrets securely](#) in Databricks or using a third-party service
- Consider whether to [implement network protections for data loss](#)
- [Restart clusters on a regular schedule](#) so that the latest patches are applied.

## Highly-secure deployments

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In addition to the configurations typical to all deployments, the following configurations are often used in highly-secure Databricks deployments. While these are common, not all highly-secure environments use all of these settings. We recommend incorporating these items and the threat model in the following section alongside your existing security practices.

- Keep an up-to-date user list by using [SCIM](#)
- [Implement network protections for data exfiltration](#)
- Evaluate whether your datasets require [bucket versioning](#)
- Evaluate whether your workflow requires using [git repos](#) or [CI/CD](#)
- Plan for and deploy [a disaster recovery site](#) if you have strong continuity requirements
- Encourage the use of [clusters that support user isolation](#)
- Configure [cluster policies](#) to enforce data access patterns and control costs
- Evaluate [tagging](#) to monitor and manage chargeback and cost control

## 4. Databricks threat model

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Databricks can at first appear to be an unusual architecture, but it aligns with typical PaaS security concerns. The most common threat categories that come up in customer conversations are, in priority order:

1. Account takeover or account compromise
2. Data exfiltration
3. Accidental insider exposure
4. Resource abuse such as crypto mining
5. Potential compromise of Databricks Inc.

This section addresses common questions about these risks, discusses probabilities, and provides mitigation strategies.

## Account takeover / account compromise

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### Risk description

Databricks is a general-purpose compute platform that can sometimes be set-up by customers to access critical data sources. If the credentials belonging to a user at one of our customers were compromised by phishing, brute force, or similar, an attacker might get access to all of the data accessible from the environment.

### Probability

Without proper protections, account takeover would be a good strategy for an attacker. Fortunately, it is easy to apply protection strategies that dramatically reduce the risk.

### Mitigation strategies

1. Strongly authenticate users. The best defense to account takeover is strong authentication. Databricks recommends the following best practices:
  - [Authenticate using single sign-on](#) (SSO)
  - [Leverage multi-factor authentication](#) (MFA)
2. Implement automation that removes or disables old employee accounts when they leave your company, reinforcing the controls mentioned above and terminating active sessions:
  - [SCIM](#) for User Deprovisioning
3. Restrict network access. Just like other SaaS or PaaS services, Databricks does not require that users log in from a specific network (like your office or VPN) unless you enable that configuration. If an account were compromised, having network access would make it easier for an attacker to Databricks. Mitigate this risk by either of the following steps:
  - Use [IP access lists](#)
4. Monitor user activities. Monitor user activities to detect anomalies (such as unusual time of login, or simultaneous remote logins):
  - Configure [Databricks audit log](#) delivery
5. Manage personal access tokens for REST API authentication. Personal access tokens are a proxy for the user who generates it, allowing full privileges. Tokens should be controlled and protected as closely as you would protect a user's credential. This is possible with:
  - [Token management](#)

## Data exfiltration

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### Risk description

If a valid user or an attacker can log into the environment, a common action on objective is to exfiltrate sensitive data from the environment, after which the attacker might store it, sell it, or ransom it.

### Probability

Generally, the probability of this attack category is low because it presumes either a malicious insider or account compromise. However, if there is a malicious insider or compromised account, attackers would likely attempt to exfiltrate data.

### Mitigation strategies

1. Network protections
  - [Implement network exfiltration protections](#) to limit where data can be sent from Databricks
2. Control data access
  - [Avoid storing production data in DBFS](#) as it is accessible via API and CLI
  - [Secure the DBFS storage account](#) to control access to your data from outside of Databricks

3. Use [data exfiltration settings within the Admin Console](#) to prevent simple methods for exfiltration

## Accidental insider exposure

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### Risk description

High-performing engineers will generally find the best or fastest way to complete their tasks, but sometimes that way may create security impacts to organizations. One user may think that their job would be much easier if they didn't have to deal with security controls, or another might helpfully copy some data to a public GCS bucket to simplify sharing of data. We can provide education for these users, but companies should also consider providing guardrails.

### Probability

There is significant variability in the likelihood and the impact of individual errors in this category, but most security professionals identify this as a significant potential risk.

### Mitigation strategies

1. Backup data and code
  - Use [GCS bucket versioning](#) so that highly-sensitive deleted data can be recovered
  - [Backup notebooks in your environment](#) using the `migrate` tool
2. Use software development lifecycle (SDLC) processes to control what code is executed
  - [Store production code in Git](#) that you can access via the Databricks Repos feature
  - Use [a CI/CD process](#) that pushes only authorized code to production
3. Make sure your users have the access necessary
  - [Use SCIM](#) for user de-provisioning and group management
  - Monitor the [Databricks audit log](#) to identify what users are logging in, and what types of clusters they're configuring
  - Use clusters that [support user isolation](#)
4. Deploy [data exfiltration protections](#), as the protection they provide against accidental insider exposure is similar to that provided against a malicious attacker

## Resource abuse

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### Risk description

Databricks can deploy large amounts of compute power. As such, it could be a valuable target for crypto mining if a customer's user account were compromised.

### Probability

This has not been a prominent activity in practice, but customers will sometimes bring up this concern.

### Mitigation strategies

1. Native GCP protections
  - Use [GCP org policies](#) to limit the resources that can be deployed
  - Regularly monitor usage data in GCP and in Databricks
  - Regularly [monitor cloud audit logs](#) to identify which systems are launched
2. Databricks protections
  - Use [cluster policies](#) to limit the maximum size and type of a cluster
  - Limit which users can [create clusters](#)
  - [Control the libraries](#) that can be used in the environment to limit the risk of compromised libraries
3. Monitoring controls
  - Monitor the [Databricks audit log](#) to identify what users are logging in, and what types of clusters they're configuring

## Compromise of Databricks, Inc.

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### Risk description

Security-minded customers sometimes voice a concern that Databricks itself might be compromised, which could result in the compromise of their environment.

### Probability

Databricks has an extremely strong security program which manages the risk of such an incident – see our [Security and Trust Center](#) for an overview on the program and the security features in the Databricks product. However, the risk for any company is never completely eliminated.

### Mitigation strategies

1. Databricks controls
  - Monitor the [Databricks audit log](#) to identify the activities of Databricks employees who provide support to your deployment
2. GCP controls
  - [Monitor cloud audit logs](#) to identify abnormal provisioning activity
3. Process controls
  - Review the [Databricks security documentation](#)

## 5. Security configuration reference

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Here are the security configurations referenced in this document.

### Authenticate via single sign-on

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Databricks on GCP integrates with Google Identity to provide [Single Sign On](#), allowing you to enforce lockout and password policies.

### Leverage multi-factor authentication

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Most identity providers (IdPs) either directly provide or integrate with multi-factor authentication (MFA) validations. The most highly-secure Databricks customers require an MFA prompt during user login, either at the Databricks prompt or through a VPN requirement.

For the highest security environments, Databricks also advocates where possible for the use of physical authentication tokens such as FIDO2 keys, that augment traditional Multi-Factor authentication by requiring interaction with a physical token that cannot be compromised.

### Separate admin accounts from normal user accounts

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It is a general best practice across all of security that an administrator should not use their privileged accounts to perform day-to-day tasks. This best practice applies to Databricks as well. If you have Databricks administrators who are also normal users of the Databricks platform (for example, there's a lead data engineer who administers the platform and also does data engineering work), Databricks recommends creating a separate account for administrative tasks.

### Use IP access lists

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[Configure IP access lists](#) that restrict the IP addresses that can authenticate to Databricks by checking if the user or API client is coming from a known good IP address range such as a VPN or office network. Established user sessions do not work if the user moves to a bad IP address, such as when disconnecting from the VPN.

IP access lists can be configured by using Terraform:

```
data "http" "my" {
  url = "https://ifconfig.me"
}

resource "databricks_workspace_conf" "this" {
  custom_config = {
    "enableIpAccessLists": true
  }
}

resource "databricks_ip_access_list" "only_me" {
  label = "only ${data.http.my.body} is allowed to access workspace"
  list_type = "ALLOW"
  ip_addresses = ["${data.http.my.body}/32"]
  depends_on = [databricks_workspace_conf.this]
}
```

This feature requires the Enterprise pricing tier.

## Databricks audit log delivery

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[Configure Databricks to store the audit log](#) in a GCS bucket under your control. You can analyze the log by using a Databricks notebook or through a third-party security analytics product. Monitor user activities to detect anomalies such as unusual time of login or simultaneous remote logins.

Databricks also recommends that customers review the blog post [monitoring your Databricks Lakehouse platform with audit logs](#). This post shows common detections and provides a working data pipeline to monitor the Databricks audit log.

Audit log delivery can be configured by using Terraform:

```
variable "databricks_account_id" {
  description = "Account Id that could be found in the bottom left corner of https://accounts.cloud.databricks.com/"
}

resource "GCP_GCS_bucket" "logdelivery" {
  bucket = "${var.prefix}-logdelivery"
  acl     = "private"
  versioning {
    enabled = false
  }
  force_destroy = true
  tags = merge(var.tags, {
    Name = "${var.prefix}-logdelivery"
  })
}

resource "GCP_GCS_bucket_public_access_block" "logdelivery" {
  bucket = GCP_GCS_bucket.logdelivery.id
}
```

```

    ignore_public_acls = true
  }

data "databricks_GCP_assume_role_policy" "logdelivery" {
  external_id = var.databricks_account_id
  for_log_delivery = true
}

resource "GCP_iam_role" "logdelivery" {
  name          = "${var.prefix}-logdelivery"
  description   = "(${var.prefix}) UsageDelivery role"
  assume_role_policy = data.databricks_GCP_assume_role_policy.logdelivery.json
  tags          = var.tags
}

data "databricks_GCP_bucket_policy" "logdelivery" {
  full_access_role = GCP_iam_role.logdelivery.arn
  bucket           = GCP_GCS_bucket.logdelivery.bucket
}

resource "GCP_GCS_bucket_policy" "logdelivery" {
  bucket = GCP_GCS_bucket.logdelivery.id
  policy = data.databricks_GCP_bucket_policy.logdelivery.json
}

resource "databricks_mws_credentials" "log_writer" {
  account_id      = var.databricks_account_id
  credentials_name = "Usage Delivery"
  role_arn        = GCP_iam_role.logdelivery.arn
}

resource "databricks_mws_storage_configurations" "log_bucket" {
  account_id              = var.databricks_account_id
  storage_configuration_name = "Usage Logs"
  bucket_name             = GCP_GCS_bucket.logdelivery.bucket
}

resource "databricks_mws_log_delivery" "audit_logs" {
  account_id = var.databricks_account_id
  credentials_id = databricks_mws_credentials.log_writer.credentials_id
  storage_configuration_id =
databricks_mws_storage_configurations.log_bucket.storage_configuration_id
  delivery_path_prefix = "audit-logs"
  config_name = "Audit Logs"
  log_type = "AUDIT_LOGS"
  output_format = "JSON"
}

```

## Token management

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Customers can use the [Token Management](#) API or UI controls to enable or disable personal access tokens (PATs) for REST API authentication, limit the users who are allowed to use PATs, set the maximum lifetime for new tokens, and manage existing tokens. Highly-secure customers typically provision a maximum token lifetime for new tokens for a workspace.

This feature requires the Enterprise pricing tier.

## Deploy with a customer-managed VPC

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By default, Databricks VPCs are managed by Databricks, which does not allow customers to implement Databricks into their existing network architecture. You can deploy Databricks into a [customer-managed VPC](#) that enables customers to route traffic through network enforcement points (such as firewalls or proxies) and to control data access using VPC endpoints.

Important note: while it is possible to deploy Databricks with public IP addresses, Databricks recommends private IP addresses and it is very unusual for a security-conscious customer to prefer public IPs.

## Implement network exfiltration protections

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By default, Databricks data plane hosts within your GCP environment have unlimited outbound network access. If you use a [customer-managed VPC](#), you can lock down outbound access using [VPC service controls](#). GCP also provides recommendations for how to use [firewalls](#) and [data exfiltration controls](#).

The TLS connections between the control plane and the data plane cannot be broken, and so it's not possible to use a technology like SSL or TLS inspection. The custom TLS certificate that would be needed cannot be pre-loaded on the GCP containers that are built for all customers.

## Avoid storing production data in DBFS

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By default, DBFS is a filesystem that is accessible to all users of the given workspace and can be accessed via API. This is not necessarily a major data exfiltration concern as you can limit access to accessing data via the DBFS API or the Databricks cli using IP access lists or private network access. However, as use of Databricks grows and more users join a workspace, those users would have access to any data stored in DBFS, creating the potential for undesired information sharing. Databricks recommends that our customers do not store production data in DBFS.

## Secure DBFS storage account

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Control where [buckets can be accessed from](#) by using a [VPC service control policy](#) to prevent direct access to storage buckets from outside of Databricks. This blocks an authorized user who connects from an uncontrolled host either through misconfiguration or an intentionally flexible policy.

## Leverage data exfiltration settings within the admin console

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The [admin console](#) contains [a variety of settings](#) that provide protection. Most admin console controls are simple enable/disable buttons. Some of the most important ones are:

- Export notebooks or cells containing code and partial interactive query results
- Download notebook results
- Block notebook clipboard features
- Download MLflow run artifacts
- Block application attacks via iFrames and cross-site scripting

## Use bucket versioning

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[GCS bucket versioning](#) stores older versions of bucket data. If through a malicious insider (or operator error) your datasets in GCS were to be accidentally deleted, bucket versioning would allow you to recover that data.

## Backup via the Databricks migration tool

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The [Databricks migration tool](#) allows admins to export most portions of their workspace and then import them into a new workspace. It is often used as a part of [disaster recovery](#) strategies to perform batch analytics of notebook code (such as secret hunting) or as a general-purpose backup of code stored in the Databricks control plane.

Guidance around these tools:

- [migrate](#) is a tool to migrate a workspace one time. It uses the Databricks CLI/API in the background.
- [databricks-sync](#) is a tool that has been used for multi cloud migrations, as well as disaster recovery synchronization of workspaces. It uses the Terraform provider to synchronize incremental changes.
- You can run either tool from a command line or from a notebook.

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## Store code in Git

The [Databricks Repos](#) feature allows you to move away from data stored just in the Databricks control plane, and instead store data in a Git repo. You can check code in/out and switch branches. Use Repos for better code visibility and tracking.

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## Manage code run via CI/CD

Mature organizations often build [production workloads by using CI/CD](#) to integrate code scanning, better control permissions, perform linting, and more. When there is highly sensitive data analyzed, a CI/CD process can also allow scanning for known scenarios such as hard coded secrets.

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## Configure a disaster recovery (DR) site

While Databricks doesn't offer disaster recovery services, many customers use Databricks capabilities including the Account API to create a cold (on standby) workspace in another region. We have [documentation](#) to guide customers through this process.

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## Isolate sensitive workloads into different workspaces

While Databricks has numerous capabilities for isolating different workloads, such as table ACLs clusters, the primary isolation method is to move sensitive workloads to a different workspace. This sometimes happens when a customer has very different teams (for example, a security team and a marketing team) who must both analyze different data in Databricks.

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## SCIM synchronization of users and groups

SCIM (System for Cross-domain Identity Management) allows you to sync groups and user status between your SAML 2.0 identity provider (IdP) and Databricks. There are four major benefits of this system:

1. When you remove a user, the user is automatically removed from Databricks. Any active sessions are terminated
2. Users can also be disabled temporarily via SCIM. Customers have used this capability for scenarios where customers believe that an account may be compromised and need to investigate
3. Groups are automatically synchronized

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## Encrypt GCS buckets and restrict access

GCS buckets are used for two roles within a Databricks deployment: the DBFS GCS bucket that Databricks creates automatically at workspace creation and additional buckets where you store your data. It is your responsibility to verify that the buckets where you store your data [are encrypted](#) and that [public access is not allowed](#). As you are responsible for the GCS buckets, you must ensure that these buckets are correctly configured and that you control access to them.

## Monitor provisioning activities in GCP Cloud Audit Logs

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A core notion in security is that you cannot purely trust the system to tell you when it is compromised. You must be able to observe the system from the outside. The [Databricks audit log](#) is an extremely valuable feature for monitoring what users do, but many customers want an outside resource to help monitor that Databricks itself doesn't do something wrong.

Cloud provider audit logs such as [Cloud Audit Logs](#) provide a great mechanism for observing the actions of Databricks (and users) in the data plane. It provides visibility into:

- Instance creation, to help identify bitcoin mining and also control for billing.
- Outbound network connections, to help identify data exfiltration.
- APIs called by the GCP account, to help identify account/key compromise.

Most customers have favorite tools in place to analyze cloud provider log data, but you can also analyze this in Databricks.

## GCP org policies

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While a very coarse control, [GCP org-level policies](#) provide an overarching control to prevent excessive resource consumption.

## Use clusters that support user isolation

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When Databricks started, standard mode clusters were the default because our customers were small engineering teams who had the same access to the same datasets. But over the years, we built out new user isolation capabilities that meet the security needs of our customers today, and so recommend utilizing clusters that support user isolation if possible.

The following types of clusters will enforce user isolation so that users with different privilege levels can coexist on the same cluster:

- High concurrency clusters with [table access control lists](#) (Table ACLs clusters for short)
- SQL endpoints

Table ACLs clusters include enforcement such that each user runs as a different non-privileged user account on the cluster host. Languages are also limited to those that can be implemented in an isolated manner (SQL and Python), and Spark APIs must be on an allowlist of those we believe to be isolation-safe.

SQL endpoints also enforce user isolation and have similar safety features, though implemented in a mechanism specific to the SQL workloads run on these clusters.

Customers with more stringent security requirements can enforce [cluster policies](#) that do not allow standard clusters to be created within the environment.

If you need standard clusters, administrators can create clusters and use Cluster ACLs to control the users permitted to attach notebooks.

## Cluster policies

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Databricks admins can control many aspects of the clusters that are spun up, including available instance types, Databricks versions, and the size of instances by using [cluster policies](#). Admins can enforce some Spark configuration settings. Admins can configure multiple cluster policies, allowing certain groups of users to create small clusters, some groups of users to create large clusters, and other groups to only use existing clusters.

## Limiting cluster creation rights

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Using either [cluster policies](#) or the older [cluster ACLs](#), admins can define what users or groups within the organization are able to create clusters.

Cluster ACLs allow you to specify which users can attach a notebook to a given cluster. Note that if a user shares a notebook already attached to a standard mode cluster, the recipient will also be able to execute code on that cluster. This does not apply to clusters that enforce user isolation: SQL endpoints, high concurrency with table ACLs clusters, and high concurrency with credential passthrough clusters.

## Controlling libraries

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By default, Databricks allows customers to install Python, R, or scala libraries from the standard public repositories, such as pypi, CRAN, or maven.

Those who are concerned about supply-chain attacks, can host their own repositories and then configure Databricks to use those instead. You can block access to other sources of libraries. Documentation for doing so is outside the scope of this document, but reach out to your Databricks team for assistance as required.

## Store and use secrets securely

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Integrating with heterogeneous systems requires managing a potentially large set of credentials and safely distributing them across an organization. Instead of directly entering your credentials into a notebook, use Databricks secrets to store your credentials and reference them in notebooks and jobs. [Databricks secret management](#) allows users to use and share credentials within Databricks securely. You can also choose to use a third party secret management service, such as GCP Secret Manager or a third party secret manager.

## Configure GCP tagging to monitor usage and enable charge-back

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To track Databricks usage through to GCP resource billing can [configure tagging](#) on clusters or pools. These can also be enforced via [cluster policies](#) for different groups within your organization.

## Apply VPC service controls

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[VPC service controls](#) enable you to isolate your production GCP resources from the internet, unauthorized VPC networks and unauthorized GCP resources. VPC service controls are fully supported by Databricks, and work with shared VPCs as well as stand-alone VPCs, and we have a [configuration guide](#) to help you get started..

## Restart clusters on a regular schedule

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Databricks clusters are ephemeral. Upon launch they will automatically use the latest available base image and container image. Users cannot choose an older version that may have security vulnerabilities, with the exception of out-of-support container images which are hidden from the UI but can be manually configured or may have been configured on a cluster before the release was hidden.

Customers are responsible for making sure that clusters are restarted periodically. Databricks does not live-patch systems--when a cluster is restarted and newer system images or containers are available, the system will automatically use the latest available images and containers.

Pools that aren't fully utilized will automatically restart a portion of available nodes.

## 6. Resources

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Many different capabilities have been discussed in this document, with documentation links where possible. Organizations who prioritize high security can learn more than what is in this document. Here are additional resources to help you learn more:

1. Request the *Enterprise Security Guide* and compliance documentation from your Databricks account team.
2. Review the security features in the [Security and Trust Center](#), along with the overall documentation about the Databricks security and compliance programs.
3. The [Security and Trust Overview Whitepaper](#) provides an overview of the Databricks architecture and platform security practices.
4. Documentation article: [Platform architecture overview](#)
5. Documentation article: [Security overview](#)
6. Whitepaper: Data Plane Host Security Summary (request from your Databricks Account Team)
7. Documentation article: [Customer support access](#), including customer-approved workspace login.